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1.  Introduction
These days the use of pre-trial detention in Europe seems to be ever increasing. 
This is in spite of the fact that the the presumption of innocence tells authorities 
to be restrictive in pre-detaining suspects. It also seems contrary to the starting 
point of the European Court of Human Rights. Basing itself on the presumption 
of innocence the Court holds that a suspect should await his trial in freedom. For 
obvious reasons, the presumption of innocence and the European case-law are often 
invoked to either state that today’s pre-trial detention practices are in violation of 
both presumption and case-law or to say that pre-trial detention practice should 
take them more into account. In this article I am concerned with the question 
whether the presumption of innocence and the case-law of the European Court 
really make an argument against all too enthousiastic use of pre-trial detention. I 
will answer that question in the negative. For that I will firstly discuss the claimed 
pre-trial detention increase in paragraph 2. Secondly, in the third paragraph, I will 
elaborate on the meaning of the presumption of innocence and I will argue that the 
presumption cannot be invoked to effectively curtail the use of pre-trial detention. 
Paragraph 4 then discusses the case-law of article 5 of the European Convention 
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on Human Rights. I will stipulate that the European Court in the elaboration of 
its afore mentioned basic assumption is not able or willing to restrict the general 
tendency of increasing pre-trial detention. In the fifth paragraph I will conclude 
my argument and I will pose some questions for the future as well.
2.  Pre-Trial Detention Practice in Today’s Risk Society
The most striking examples of pre-trial detention being used in a rather unrestricted 
way may be found in recent measures regarding the detention of suspected terrorists: 
Guantanamo Bay being the ultimate example. However, many European countries, 
to a certain extent have also relaxed the rules on pre-trial detention for reasons of 
preventing further terrorist harm.1 But even leaving terrorism aside, research shows 
that existing requirements on the use of pre-trial detention are easily met. Dutch 
judges indicate that it is relatively easy to meet the grounds on which pre-trial 
detention can be based. “If you are skilful, you can virtually detain anyone”, one 
interviewed judge pointed out.2 Similarly, extensive interpretation of grounds for 
pre-trial detention seems to be present in German pre-trial detention decisions.3 
Also, English research on bail practice has shown that magistrates are generally 
happy to follow the Crown Prosecution Service’s view.4
This apparent lenient interpretation of the rules that govern pre-trial detention 
should be expected to show in the figures. Indeed, English figures indicate that in 
England the number of defendants remanded in custody is rising.5 With regard 
to the Netherlands increase in the use of pre-trial detention has been subjectively 
experienced by legal practitioners for many years and can be seen objectively in 
the figures as well. For example, recent Dutch research has established that since 
1995 the use of pre-trial detention in the Netherlands has doubled in terms of 
1) See, amongst others, Article 67 paragraph 4 of The Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure that loosens 
the degree of suspicion necessary for the first period of pre-trial detention for terrorist crimes. See 
for example also the Press release of 25 July 2008 by the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
regarding Final Conclusions and Recommendations on Reports of the United Kingdom, France, 
San Marino and Ireland: <www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/NewsRoom?OpenFrameSet>.
2) F. van der Heide et al. (eds.), Strafrechter en strafketen: de gang van zaken (1995-2006), 59.
3) P. Albrecht, “Die Untersuchungshaft – ein Straf- oder Schuldspruch? Ein Plädoyer für den Grund-
satz der Unschuldvermutung im Haftrecht”, in A. Donatsch et al. (eds.), Strafrecht, Strafprozessrecht 
und Menschenrechte, Festschrift für Stefan Trechsel zum 65. Geburtstag (Zürich, 2002), 362.
4) S. Jones, “Guilty until Proved Innocent? The Diminished Status of Suspects at the Point of 
Remand and as Unconvicted Prisoners”, Common Law World Review 32 (2003), 404. 
5) S. Jones, “Guilty until Proved Innocent? The Diminished Status of Suspects at the Point of 
Remand and as Unconvicted Prisoners”, Common Law World Review 32 (2003), 404. 
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percentage.6 Furthermore, with regard to several European countries, the Council 
of Europe’s annual penal statistics reveal that pre-trial detainees continue to make 
up an important part of the total prison population and that the mean rates of 
untried prisoners are tending to go up rather than to go down.7 
Obviously, further and more in depth research should be conducted but for 
now it is by no means irresponsible to assume that the facts and figures on pre-trial 
detention can be connected to the concept of the risk society. The relaxation of the 
rules, the relaxed interpretation of the rules and the additional figures indicate that 
pre-trial detention is increasingly used in an easier and assumably preventive and 
risk controling way. Not only harsher sentencing and increased use of imprisonment 
are features of the culture of control.8 Pre-detaining suspects has become part of 
the state’s strategy of managing risk as well.9 
3.  The Limited Restricting Abilities of the Presumption of Innocence on 
Pre-Trial Detention  
To detain a suspect is to deprive him from his liberty without having a judge 
establish his guilt within a fair trial. A pre-trial detainee may turn out to be innocent 
in the end. Therefore, when pre-trial detention is perceived to be applied too easily, 
too often or too long, it is alleged that pre-trial detention practice should be more 
in keeping with the presumption of innocence.10 The presumption requires that 
6) See research by the Dutch Council of the Judiciary, F. van der Heide et al., loc. cit., p. 24.
7) See the World Pre-trial/Remand Imprisonment List 2008, download from <www.kcl.ac.uk/
depsta/law/research/icps/publications.php>. See also the Council of Europe’s SPACE I reports on 
<www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/Prisons_and_alternatives/>. See also S.Deltenre 
and E. Maes, “Pre-Trial Detention and the Overcrowding of Prisons in Belgium”, European Journal 
of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 12 (2004), 348-370.
8) See with regard to the United States and the United Kingdom D. Garland, The Culture of Control. 
Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Oxford, 2001). Concerning several European 
Countries see N. Lacey, The Prisoners’ Dilemma. Political Economy and Punishment in Contemporary 
Democracies (Cambridge, 2007). 
 With regard to the Netherlands see H. Boutellier, De veiligheidsutopie: hedendaags onbehagen 
en verlangen rond misdaad en straf (Den Haag, 2005). See also M.J. Borgers, De vlucht naar voren 
(Den Haag, 2007), 8-12. Concerning Ireland see L. Campbell, “The Culture of Control in Ireland: 
Theorising Recent Developments in Criminal Justice”, Web Journal of Current Legal Issues 1 (2008), 
<www.webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2008/issue1/campbell1.html>.
9) See also P. Albrecht, loc. cit., pp. 362-366; Liz Cambell, “Reconfiguring the Pre-trial and Trial 
Processes in Ireland in the Fight against Organised Crime”, International Journal of Evidence and 
Proof 12 (2008), 232. 
10) See for example P. Albrecht, loc. cit., pp. 355-372; P. LeRoy, “The Reign of the Queen of Hearts: 
the Declining Significance of the Presumption of Innocence”, Cleveland State Law Review (1989) 
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the state treats a suspect as if he were innocent. Evidently, this is not a factual but a 
normative assumption. It is, according to Ashworth, a moral and political principle, 
based on a widely shared conception of how a free society should exercise the power 
to punish. The state has far-reaching powers to investigate, prosecute, try and 
punish. In a democratic society it is expected that these powers should be exercised 
with respect for the autonomy and dignity of each individual.11 The presumption of 
innocence thus protects the individual against arbitrary and excessive state action.12 
Thus, when a suspect is deprived of his liberty there must be good reason to do so. 
Furthermore, the presumption contains the concept that – even though pre-trial 
detention inevitably holds a punitive element – pre-trial detention should not be 
aimed at or amount to an actual punishment.13 
Ashworth also points out that the presumption of innocence is a potential 
boundary for all too easy use of remand practices in general, and to recent British 
anti-terrorist control-orders restricting a person’s right to liberty in particular.14 
This line of thinking is furthermore found in various European legal instruments. 
In its Green paper on “mutual recognition of non-custodial pre-trial supervision 
measures”, aimed at reducing excessive use and length of pre-trial detention the Eu-
ropean Commission, particular reference is made to strengthening the presumption 
of innocence.15 Likewise and with the same purpose, the committee of ministers 
of the Council of Europe stresses the presumption’s fundamental importance 
in its Recommendation on the use of remand in custody.16 The presumption of 
innocence is thus widely assumed to curtail the imposition of pre-trial detention. 
393-416; S. Jones, loc. cit., pp. 399-417, S. Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford, 
2005), 180.
11) A. Ashworth, “Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence”, International Journal of Evidence 
and Proof 10 (2006), 249. See also R. Kitai, “Presuming Innocence”, Oklahoma Law Review 55 (2000), 
280-284.
12) See also N. Keijzer, “Enkele opmerkingen omtrent de praesumptio innocentiae in strafzaken”, 
in Ch.J. Enschedé et al. (eds.), Naar eer en geweten (Arnhem, 1987), 245-246. 
13) M.S. Groenhuijsen, “De nabije toekomst van de voorlopige hechtenis, in het bijzonder in het 
licht van de onschuldpreasumptie”, in J. de Hullu and W.E.C.A. Valkenburg (eds.), Door Straatsburg 
geïnspireerde grondnormen voor het Nederlandse strafproces (Deventer, 2000), 95.
14) A. Ashworth and M. Redmayne, op. cit., in particular pp. 234-235, A. Ashworth, loc. cit., pp. 
275-276.
15) Commission of the European Communities, Green paper on mutual recognition of non-custodial 
pre-trial supervision measures, Brussels 2004 COM(2004)562 def., p. 3, and the annex SEC(2004) 
1046, pp. 17-18. 
16) Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the use of remand 
in custody, the conditions in which it takes place and the provision of safeguards against abuse, 
Rec(2006)13. 
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But where then, does the presumption draw the line? Which criteria regarding 
the use of pre-trial detention can be derived from the presumption of innocence 
and how strict should they be interpreted? Is the current extensive use of pre-trial 
detention practice violating the presumption of innocence?
The European documents do not give an answer to those questions. In literature 
different approaches can be found. Keijzer en Groenhuijsen consider the presump-
tion of innocence to represent a certain weight in matters concerning the use of 
means of coercion such as pre-trial detention. When legislation is drafted but also 
when a judicial decision to detain a suspect is taken, the presumption of innocence 
is weighed against other principles and interests and in so doing a certain line is 
drawn.17 The standard of reasonable suspicion is an example of such a line. In 
the same way Groenhuijsen finds the pre-trial detention grounds of risk of flight, 
collusion, repetition and public disorder to be in accordance with the presumption 
of innocence.18 He infers that procedural goals, as well as the purpose of giving a 
proper social reaction to an offence, the latter to which risk of repetition and public 
disorder contribute, both justify the tension with the presumption of innocence.19 
It is not surprising that Groenhuijsen thus basically finds a confirmation of the 
presumption in the existing (Dutch)20 legal system of pre-trial detention.21 
Some authors such as Llobet Rodriquez, Albrecht, and Den Hartog however, 
criticize the grounds of risk of repetition and/or risk of public disorder. It is asserted 
that in order to respect the presumption of innocence pre-trial detention should 
only be allowed for reasons that serve purposes of the procedure itself. Risk of 
repetition and risk of public disorder only serve general criminal interests, not 
the procedure itself. Consequently, pre-trial detention based on these grounds 
is considered to be too punitive and therefore in violation of the presumption 
17) M.S. Groenhuijsen, loc cit., pp. 95-96; N. Keijzer, loc. cit., p. 246.
18) See M.S. Groenhuijsen, loc. cit., pp. 95-97.
19) Groenhuijsen actually refers to the Dutch ground of the “seriously rocked legal order”. A rocked 
legal order and a public disorder are theoretically not one and the same but in practice both grounds 
seem to a large extent to be connected to the gravity of the offence. The European Court, as will be 
discussed later, also considers them as equivalents.
20) Since the Dutch grounds for pre-trial detention can in essence be found in most criminal proce-
dures – they are also in more or less the same terms defined by the United Nations – Groenhuijsen’s 
opinion would apply to more than only the Dutch system.
21) See P.H. van Kempen and F. Kristen, “Plicht tot toepassen van alternatieven voor voorarrest”, 
NJCM-bulletin 2005, in particular pp. 1155-1156, and P.H.P.H.M.C. van Kempen and FG.H. Kristen, 
“Alternatieven voor voorarrest vanuit Europees perspectief ”, in A.H.E.C. Jordaans, P.A.M. Mevis 
and J. Wöretshofer (eds.), Praktisch strafrecht (Nijmegen, 2005), 319.
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of innocence.22 These authors ascribe therefore an absolute restriction to the 
presumption and argue that existing pre-trial detention systems that accept these 
grounds – which are many systems – are violating it. In a way the same seems to 
be done by Ashworth when he interprets public disorder in a restrictive manner. 
He understands the ground as serving the interest of the suspect who committed a 
serious crime and has to be locked up for his own protection.23 Within this meaning, 
public disorder does not so much serve general criminal interest but more so the 
individual interest of the suspect and equally procedure itself.
More examples of different approaches could be given. But the point is that 
literature seems to be utterly divided on the standards that can be deduced from the 
presumption of innocence curtailing pre-trial detention. Moreover, the European 
institutions fail to give any standards. Literature shows that existing rules can 
be either confirmed or rejected by the presumption. Many arguments – and to 
my opinion none of them compelling – are balanced in many different ways by 
many different scholars. To me this indicates that the presumption of innocence 
can be seen as an important but abstract principle operating in the background. 
It is relevant in the sense that it constantly reminds us that we are dealing with a 
possible innocent individual and that a possibility of error in accusing this person 
exists. Its function is to stress that state action should not be arbitrary and that 
the right to liberty should be taken into account and.24 It gives weight as such 
to the right to liberty but what weight exactly or what the outcome should be of 
balancing the individual right against public interests, it does not tell.25 For this 
22) See with regard to risk of repetition as well as public disorder :J. Llobet Rodríquez, Die Unschuld-
vermutung und die materiellen Voraussetzungen der Untersuchungshaft. Ein Beitrag zus Strafprozessreform 
in Lateinamerika (Freiburg, 1995), 134-150 (recidivism), pp. 122-128 (public disorder) and P. Albrecht, 
loc. cit. pp. 357-358 and 368. It must however be noted that Albrecht does acknowledge the possibility 
of pre-trial detention on preventive grounds in Polizeirecht. See on public disorder J.D. den Hartog, 
“De onschuldpresumptie: grenzen aan de gronden waarop de voorlopige hechtenis mag worden 
bevolen”, in J.L.M. Boek et al. (eds.), Grensoverschrijdend strafrecht (Arnhem, 1990), 137.
23) A. Ashworth and M. Redmayne, The Criminal Process (Oxford, 2005), 213.
24) Countries such as communist China and the (just ex-) communist Soviet Union, that valued the 
public interest over the individual interest and that relied on the state’s objectivity and infallibility 
not surprisingly were suspicious of the presumption of innocence or even denied its existence. See 
G.V. Thieme, “The Debate on the Presumption of Innocence in the People’s Republic of China”, 
Review of Socialist Law 10 (1984),  277-290; compare also T.A. Gelatt, “The Peoples Republic of 
China and the Presumption of Innocence”, The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 73 (1982), 
259-316. With regard to the Soviet Union see J. Quigley, “The Soviet Conception of the Presumption 
of Innocence”, Santa Clara Law Review 29 (1989), 301-330.
25) See also P.H.P.H.M.C. van Kempen and F.G.H. Kristen, loc. cit., pp. 317-320. See also P.J. 
Schwikkard, Presumption of Innocence (Kenwyn, 1999), 35-39. Because of the lack of practical utility 
of the presumption of innocence in the sense of a policy consideration and thus the danger of 
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depends on the way individual rights and public interests are valued at a certain 
moment in a certain society. The presumption of innocence is thus a principle 
that has little operational value with regard to pre-trial detention when trying to 
improve or criticize it. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the presumption of 
innocence itself cannot be used as an effective argument against the ever increasing 
use of pre-trial detention as discerned in nowadays practice.
4.  The Article 5 Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights
4.1.  Introduction 
Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the individual 
right to liberty. Pre-trial detention is – within limitations – acknowledged as a 
legitimate exception to the right to liberty. Further rules and restrictions on the 
legitimacy of the exception are developed in the case-law of the European Court. 
Interestingly, in its case-law the Court positions the presumption of innocence at 
the centre of its evaluative framework. In view of my earlier argument regarding 
the inability of the presumption of innocence to set specific restrictions I will 
therefore also look into the question whether the Court attaches specific restrictive 
criteria to the presumption. But most important, I will scrutinize the Court’s 
case-law in order to see where the Court has drawn the lines and to what extent 
the case-law law may provide an argument against today’s “preventive” and “easy” 
use of pre-trial detention. 
4.2.  General (Strict) Principles and Standards
To reach an understanding of the Court’s case-law on pre-trial detention the first 
thing to do is discern the general principles that were set out by the Court. Every 
single decision on pre-trial detention by the ECHR contains an explanation of 
the principles that were established over the years. For this the Court uses the 
following standard formula:26 
It falls in the first place to the national judicial authorities to ensure that, in a given case, the 
pre-trial detention of an accused person does not exceed a reasonable time. To this end they 
must examine all the circumstances arguing for or against the existence of a genuine requirement 
of public interest justifying, with due regard to the principle of the presumption of innocence, 
vagueness, Schwikkard even restricts the definition of the presumption. In her opinion it is only a 
rule regulating the burden of proof.
26) See also A. Ashworth and M. Redmayne, op. cit., p. 208 and P. van Dijk and Y. Arai, Theory and 
Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (Antwerpen, 2006), 493-497.
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a departure from the rule of respect for individual liberty and set them out in their decisions 
on the applications for release. 27
It is clear that the right to liberty and the presumption of innocence are put 
forward as the fundamental starting point for pre-trial decisions. Yet, the Court 
does not subsequently and explicitly connect the presumption of innocence 
with specific restricting criteria. This fits the assumption that the presumption is 
rather a general idea against arbitrary state actions than a principle setting specific 
standards itself.28 However, the Court has set various standards in its case-law that 
reflect the general idea of the presumption, i.e. the thought that pre-trial detention 
should be used carefully. Some of these standards are rather concrete, others are 
more open standards.
First, the Court stresses that the persistence of a reasonable suspicion is a conditio 
sine qua non for the validity of the continued detention. After a certain lapse of 
time however, the suspicion no longer suffices and the detention must in addition 
be based on “relevant and sufficient” grounds. This open standard has been made 
slightly more specific by categorising four accepted reasons (or public interests) 
for pre-trial detention. In the Smirnova case the Court distinguishes: the risk that 
the accuse will fail to appear for trial, the risk that the accused would take action 
to prejudice the administration of justice, the risk that the accused will commit 
further offences and finally, the risk that the release of the accused will cause public 
disorder.29 When applying these grounds stereotypical reasoning is not allowed: 
each case needs to be assessed individually.30 Besides the condition of relevant and 
sufficient foundation of the pre-trial detention the Court demands the national 
authorities to display “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings. Fur-
thermore, the national courts have an obligation to consider alternative measures 
when deciding whether a person should be released or detained. The Court reasons 
that the public interest may just as well be served by placing the suspect under 
police surveillance or releasing him on bail.31 
27) ECHR 27 November 1991, appl. no. 12718/87 (Clooth v. Belgium), para. 36, ECHR 27 November 
1991 appl. no. 12325/86 and 14992/89 (Kemmache v. France), para. 45, ECHR 6 April, 2000, appl. no. 
26772/95 (Labita v. Italy), paras. 152-153.
28) P.H.P.H.M.C. van Kempen and F.G.H. Kristen, loc. cit., p. 319.
29) ECHR 24 July 2003, appl. no. 46133/99 and 48183/99 (Smirnova v. Russia), para. 59.
30) ECHR 8 June 1995, appl. no. 16419/90 and 16426/90 (Yagci & Sargin v. Turkey), para. 52, ECHR 
4 October 2005, appl. no. 3456/05 (Sarban v. Moldova), para. 101.
31) ECHR 23 June 2005, Latasiewic v. Poland, para. 59, ECHR 20 January 2004, G.K v. Poland, 
para. 85; ECHR 21 December 2000, Jabloński v. Poland, para. 83. ECHR 27 June 1968, Neumeister 
v. Austria, paras. 3-4.
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Thus, looking at the Court’s reasoning above the importance of the right to 
liberty is firmly stressed, the public interests on which pre-trial detention may 
be based are restricted, and national authorities are urged to conscientiously 
motivate their decisions and to look for alternatives. To put it briefly, these general 
standards strongly create the impression that pre-trial detention should be used 
very reluctantly.
4.3.  “Length” and “Diligence” Watering Downt the Requirement of Reasoned Pre-
Trial Detention
The essence of the Court’s standards contains that there must be good reasons 
for detaining a suspect. “Sufficient and relevant grounds” is, however, an open 
norm the application of which depends on the way the Court interprets it in a 
given case. The restricting potential of this requirement is already watered down 
by the phrasing of the standard reasoning itself. It focuses on the reasonable length 
of the pre-trial detention. The grounds provided for by the national authorities 
therefore are not examined for their tenability as such but are always looked at 
from the duration perspective. Furthermore, reasonable length is a relative matter. 
The cases in which the Court establishes a violation of Article 5 paragraph 3 of 
the Convention vary in length from 18 months to five years pre-trial detention. 
The same time span occurs in cases in which the Court declares the complaint 
in-admissible. Complaining about a few months is not something the Court will 
reward quickly though. In for example the case of Hendriks v. the Netherlands the 
Court almost seems to issue a type of warning when stating that Hendrik’s pre-trial 
detention of almost 6 months had been significantly shorter than the cases in which 
a violation was found (Letellier and Smirnova indeed were about periods of almost 
three years and four years pre-trial detention respectively).32 Also, the Court refers 
to a period of 18 months pre-trial detention as “not very significant”.33 In the case 
of Hengl v. Austria the Commission at the time did not even look into the merits 
of a case of three months detention on suspicion of various fraud offences and 
merely stated that the reasonable length had not been exceeded.34
Moreover, the focus on reasonable length puts into perspective the requirement 
of considering alternative measures. Looking at the reasoning in the decisions 
Jabloński v. Poland and Czarnecki v. Poland, one would think this concerns a firm 
32) ECHR 5 July 2007, appl. no. 43701/04 (Hendriks v. the Netherlands). Also see the reasoning in 
ECHR 23 January 2007, 1427/03 (Prokopyszyn v. Poland ) in which case there was a pre-trial detention 
of approximately five months. 
33) ECHR 10 January 2006, appl. no. 34090/96 (W.B. v. Poland ), para. 66.
34) ECHR 1 December 1993, appl. no. 20178/92 (Hengl v. Austria).
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requirement for every situation in which a decision on pre-trial detention has to 
be made.35 However, Jabloński en Czarnecki concerned pre-trial detention of three 
years and nine months, and five years respectively. In most other cases in which 
the Court points out the need of considering alternative measures, the detention 
period is considerable.36 Furthermore, it needs to be noticed that the court in many 
cases does not point out the (non-compliance of the) obligation of considering 
alternative measures. This indicates the alternative obligation similarly being highly 
dependent on the specific features of the case.37
Duration of pre-trial detention is relevant in another way as well. To substantiate 
an initial period of pre-trial detention a reasonable suspicion will suffice. The reach 
of such a period is not clear but in any case a period of nine weeks has been accepted 
by the Court.38 Besides this initial period, it seems the Court recognises another 
“first period”. This period is about the time necessary to terminate the investigation, 
to draw up the bill of indictment and to hear evidence from the accused.39 In Guz 
v. Poland – Guz was detained on several counts including suspicion of aggravated 
assault and handling stolen goods – the Court accepted an initial “research” period 
for a time span of eight months.40 The relation between both mentioned initial 
periods is not very distinct. Clear though, is the fact that the requirement of the 
substantiation of the pre-trial detention by the national authorities is more or less 
left undone for this initial period of research and administration. The Court, in a 
way, accepts relevant and sufficient grounds for such a period while the mentioned 
35) ECHR 21 December 2000, appl. no. 33492/96 (Jabloński v. Poland ), ECHR 28 July 2005, appl. 
no. 75112/01 (Czarnecki v. Poland ).
36) See for example ECHR 26 April 2005, appl. no. 49929/99 (Chodecki v. Poland ) (three years 
and eleven months of pre-trial detention), ECHR 26 January 2007, appl. no. 44115/98 (Wedler v. 
Poland ) (three years pre-trial detention), ECHR 26 July 2001, appl. no. 34097/96 (Kreps v. Poland ) 
(four years and three months). Cases with shorter periods are at hand as well. One year and a half 
in ECHR 15 February 2005, appl. no. 55939/00 (Sulaoja v. Estonia), or even nine months in ECHR 
6 November 2007, appl. no. 30779/04 (Patsuria v. Georgia). These periods should however also be 
seen in the light of all the various circumstances of the cases concerned. Such as the situation that 
national legislation contains an irrefutable presumption of risk of flight and to what extent the suspect 
is taken seriously in his nearly infinite protests against his detention. See also para. 5 hereafter. 
37) One could think of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding footnote but equally of the 
situation in which a risk of flight – that is easiest controlled by an alternative security – is the only 
ground brought forward. 
38) ECHR 20 March 2001, appl. 33591/96 (Bouchet v. France), para. 41.
39) ECHR 26 September 2006, appl. no. 29293/02 (Guz v. Poland ).
40) ECHR 26 September 2006, appl. no. 29293/02 (Guz v. Poland ). The “nature of the offence” 
influencing such a period will be dealt with in the next paragraph.
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reasons as terminating the investigation, etc. are not specifically connected to 
these grounds.41 
As put forward in paragraph 4.2, the examination of reasonable length is not 
limited to the existence of relevant and sufficient grounds but also includes the 
question whether the national authorities displayed special diligence in the conduct 
of the proceedings. This means it is for the authorities to bring the case to a verdict 
swiftly and carefully. Both requirements – “substantiation” and “special diligence” – 
are presented by the court as two different matters. After ascertaining relevant and 
sufficient reasons the diligence still has to be scrutinised. However as mentioned 
already, this assessment works the other way around too. In case of a relatively 
short pre-trial detention, which period was efficiently used for investigation and 
trial, the Court accepts this research period as sufficient ground for a reasonable 
detention without controlling the grounds put forward by the authorities. Special 
diligence is therefore not just an assessment supplementary to the grounds but also 
affects the way the grounds are evaluated. This intertwinement of the diligence 
assessment and the assessment of the grounds likewise comes forward in the cases 
with a remarkably long detention for which the Court establishes insufficient 
grounds and a lack of proper conduct.42 Another indication is found in the fact 
that for both checks it is relevant whether or not the pre-trial detention was subject 
to judicial control regularly.43 
The explanation above demonstrates that the requirement to specify the reasons 
on pre-trial detention is not only dependent on the length of the detention but 
equally on the way the procedure was conducted. This means that the Court 
allows grounds for pre-trial detention to be interpreted leniently or even allows 
that pre-trial detention for a certain period does not need very specific grounds. 
That entails that one of the possible components of the increasing use of pre-trial 
detention – the lenient judicial interpretation as discussed in paragraph 2 – will 
not be countered by the standards as developed in the European Court’s case-law. 
This is, as long as the pre-trial detention does not not take too long. But not too 
long in the Court’s opinion might still be a year or two.
41) It needs to be stressed however that in the case of Guz v. Poland a danger of flight justified the 
pre-trial detention after the initial period. It is hard do say whether and to what extent the presence 
of this ground influenced the acceptance of the initial period.
42) When the Court deems the grounds insufficient the diligence normally does not need to be 
checked anymore. This is nevertheless explicitly done by the Court in cases in which the national 
authorities seem to have been negligent in all respects. See for example ECHR 28 July 2005, appl. no. 
75112/01 (Czarnecki v. Poland ), para. 44, ECHR 8 November 2005, appl. no. 6847/02 (Khudoyorov 
v. Russia), para. 188.
43) See for example ECHR 23 January 2007, appl. no. 1427/03 (Prokopyszyn v. Poland ), ECHR 14 
September 2000, appl. no. 34447/97 (Szofer v. Poland ).
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4.4.  A Rather Formal Control 
The design of the national legal procedure for pre-trial detention and the way in 
which it is factually given shape are important factors within the Court’s reasoning 
on pre-trial detention. This too, plays a part in the way the administration of 
pre-trial detention is assessed. The Court, or previously the Commission, often 
recognises the fact that the pre-trial detention was subject to regular judicial 
control.44 That control, however, should not just be a formality. When a national 
court repeatedly may confine to the statement that no grounds exist for letting 
the suspect go free and the suspect then needs to show there are such grounds, 
this does not amount to effective judicial control but to mandatory pre-trial 
detention.45 Also, to systematically ignore the suspect’s arguments in favour of 
release cannot be said to be effective judicial control. This way of disregarding 
the suspect’s procedural position is usually demonstrated when a suspect has 
repeatedly asked over a long period of time to be released on bail or under police 
supervision (as provided by national law).46 On the other hand, if a suspect does 
not invoke his legal rights to argue the (grounds for) pre-trial detention47 or if he 
does not bring up any conclusive arguments against or realistic alternatives for 
the detention, this might be an argument against his release.48 So it seems that the 
right to an adversarial criminal proceeding – that is a basic assumption within the 
European Human Right’s case-law on Article 6 of the Convention – plays a part 
within the Article 5 case-law regarding the question whether pre-trial detention was 
justified. This all makes the human rights check on pre-trial detention formal to 
a considerable degree. Such a formal check is able to correct procedures in which 
a prosecution seems to be polically instigated49 or procedures in which one could 
44) See for example ECHR 1 September 1993, appl. no. 19929/92 (H.Ö. v. Germany), ECHR 6 March 
2007, appl. no. 8036/02 (Sağat et al. v. Turkey), ECHR 25 November 2004, appl. no. 4493/04 (Szofer 
v. Poland ), ECHR 10 January 2006, appl. no. 34090/96 (W.B. v. Poland ), ECHR 15 June 2006, 
appl. no. 39251/98 (Wegrzyn v. Poland ), ECHR 23 januari 2007, appl. no. 1427/03 (Prokopyszyn v. 
Poland ).
45) ECHR 26 July 2001, appl. no. 33977/96 (Ilijkov v. Bulgaria), paras. 79-85, ECHR 8 April 2004, 
appl. no. 44062/98 (Hamanov v. Bulgaria), para. 70, ECHR 2 February 2006, appl. no. 41211/98 
(Iovchev v. Bulgaria), paras. 106-110, ECHR 2 March 2006, appl. no. 11886/05 (Dolgova v. Russia), 
paras. 43-46.
46) ECHR 4 October 2005, appl. no. 9190/03 (Becciev v. Moldavia), para. 62, ECHR 25 October 
2007, appl. no. 42940/06 (Govorushko v. Russia), para. 49. 
47) ECHR 15 May 1996, appl. no. 22439/93 (Weixelbraun v. Austria). 
48) ECHR 22 June 1995, appl. no. 19382/92 (Van der Tang v. Spain), para. 67.
49) ECHR 8 November 2005, appl. no. 6847/02 (Khudoyorov v. Russia), ECHR 2 March 2006, appl. 
no. 11886/05 (Dolgova v. Russia), ECHR 6 December 2007, appl. no. 25664/05 (Lind v. Russia). Also: 
ECHR 4 October 2005, appl. no. 3456/05 (Sarban v. Moldavia).
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doubt the impartiality and independency of the judiciary.50 It does however, not 
put a hold on the increasing use of pre-trial detention in a society that is “merely” 
averting risks.
4.5.  The European Court on Public Disorder and the Role of the Gravity of the 
Offence
Probably the most controversial reason for substantiating pre-trial detention is the 
ground of public disorder.51 Its precise meaning has never been really elaborated 
on but the essence of detaining a suspect for reasons of public disorder lies within 
the particular seriousness of the offence committed, and the (possible) reaction of 
society to it. The ground is therefore closely related to the punishment threatening 
the offence52 and to the extent the society disapproves of certain behaviour. Thus, 
the punitive element that is always present in pre-trial detention is most prominent 
when the detention is based on public disorder. Referring to the presumption of 
innocence some therefore advocate that the ground should be strictly defined53 or 
reluctantly applied,54 others find public disorder to be per se incompatible with 
the presumption of innocence (see para. 3). 
The European Court accepted public disorder as a ground for pre-trial detention 
in the Letellier case but at the same time underlined that it was only to be used 
in exceptional circumstances. For example, only in particularly grave offences 
that give rise to a social disturbance can public disorder “be regarded as relevant 
and sufficient only provided that it is based on facts capable of showing that the 
accused’s release would actually disturb public order”. Relying on just the gravity 
of the offence will not suffice, the Court points out. In addition, the Court held 
that detention of this ground will continue to be legitimate only if public order 
remains actually threatened. Its continuation cannot be used to anticipate a 
custodial sentence.55 
50) ECHR 25 October 2007, appl. no. 42940/06 (Govorushko v. Russia), ECHR 6 December 2007, 
appl. no. 25664/05 (Lind v. Russia).
51) See F. Duenkel and J. Vagg, “Conclusions”, in Waiting for Trial (Freiburg, 1994), 954, See also 
Rodriquez, loc. cit., p. 123, who even connects the ground with the Nazi regime.
52) F. Duenkel and J. Vagg, loc. cit., p. 954. 
53) M.S. Groenhuijsen, loc. cit., p. 96 and J. uit Beijerse, Op verdenking gevangen gezet (Nijmegen, 
1998), 202-203.
54) The extensive way in which public disorder is being applied by the Dutch judiciary has brought 
about many critical reactions. See L. Stevens, “De praktijk van de Nederlandse voorlopige hechtenis 
vanuit Straatsburgs perspectief: klaag niet te snel”, Delikt & Delinkwent (2007), 499-514.
55) ECHR 26 June 1991, appl. no. 12369/86 (Letellier v. France) para. 51.
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This reasoning suggests that there should be specific indications of a (danger of ) 
social disturbance in the case at hand. For indications one could maybe think of 
the media attention the case already attracted, public protest, or agitation within a 
small community that served as crime scene. Nevertheless, several decisions of the 
European Court demonstrate that the requirement of specifying public disorder 
is not that strict after all. In two Dutch cases the Court found that a detention of 
three months for (relatively small scale) drug trafficking and one of six months for 
rape could be based on the ground that the accused was suspected of an act that 
“carried a punishment of imprisonment of twelve years or more and the legal order 
had been seriously rocked by that act”.56 The national courts did not further specify 
or individualise the existence of the “rocked” legal order. And although at first 
sight disturbing legal order seems an even more abstract concept than disturbing 
public order, the Court accepts this ground as an equivalent of public disorder and 
holds it a sufficient foundation for the pre-trial detention. But, without any further 
specification or substantiation, what else than the gravity of the offence is there 
to constitute this ground? And if the gravity of the offence is the single factor in 
constituting public disorder, is it not so that the pre-trial detention in fact amounts 
to punishment, this being a violation of the presumption of innocence?
It is true that the decisions in the Dutch cases were probably motivated to a 
large extent by the relatively short periods of pre-trial detention in both situa-
tions. The court puts forward that the passage of time will generally weaken the 
justification of pre-trial detention based on these abstract considerations. Some 
inadmissibility decisions, however, show periods of three to four years detention 
being based upon public disorder.57 Moreover, in certain cases the Court explains 
that the gravity of the offence on its own is insufficient for substantiating “public 
disorder” but at the same time accepts as part of the required extra foundation 
the fact that the suspicion is about serious and large scale drug crimes.58 In the 
56) ECHR 5 July 2007 (Kanzi v. the Netherlands) and ECHR 5 July 2007 (Hendriks v. the 
Netherlands). 
57) With regard to suspicion of drug trafficking see ECHR 23 May 1999, appl. no. 34033/96 (Daugy 
v. France), ECHR 4 May 2004, appl. no. 64117 (Guala v. France), disturbing public order by stealing 
a criminal file from the Court of Justice, ECHR 4 September 1996, appl. no. 24239/94 (Tressel v. 
France), public order and committing murder by a long career criminal respectively a neighbour, 
ECHR 9 April 1997, appl. no. 28896/95 (Abouchiche v. France) and ECHR 22 October 1997, appl. 
no. 30475/96 (Louchart v. France), and the disturbance of the public order in case of multiple armed 
bank robberies, ECHR 16 April 1998, appl. no. 33477/96 (Lahmar v. France). Note that pre-trial 
detention in these cases had also been ordered on other grounds such as risk of flight or risk of 
committing crimes. Their influence on the Court’s decision cannot be excluded. 
58) ECHR 23 May 1999, appl. no. 34033/96 (Daugy v. France), ECHR 4 May 2004, appl. no. 64117/00 
(Guala v. France).
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author’s view this substantiation is no more than a relatively general reference to 
the gravity of the offence. The additionally mentioned circumstances of the harm 
and crime caused by drug trafficking are in the same way closely related to this 
general gravity. A similar “gravity of the offence based” argumentation can be found 
in a case concerning suspicion of organised counterfeiting. The Court deemed 
public disorder to be present for a period of three years and five months since the 
suspicion was regarding a crime that violated one of the states most elementary 
functions, the issuing of money.59
Before concluding, it is worth noting that the gravity of the offence may also 
play a leading part with regard to pre-trial detention for crimes that are deemed 
to be of a terrorist nature. Naturally, no far-reaching inferences should be made 
from one or two specific cases. However, it is at least interesting that the Court 
accepted that due to the usual complexity of investigation in terrorism cases PKK 
suspects could be held in detention for one year and six months on the mere basis 
of the serious nature of the offence alone. This offence concerned arson to three 
cars by throwing a Molotov cocktail.60 
Thus, it can be asserted that the gravity of the offence can be a very important 
factor or even a single ground for justifying pre-trial detention. When besides the 
fact that a serious crime was committed there are no other independent reasons 
for detaining a suspect one can say that the punitive element of pre-trial deten-
tion is very prominent. One could even wonder whether “pre-detaining” has not 
actually turned into “already punishing”. A European Court allowing this use 
of pre-trial detention is not expected to limit national authorities in their use of 
pre-trial detention.
5.  No Restriction on Pre-Trial Detention by The European Convention and 
the Presumption of Innocence
Pre-trial detention will always be a worrying aspect of criminal law. Balancing 
individual liberty and public interest – public security in particular – produces 
dilemmas.61 In trying to find a balance, the presumption of innocence is often used 
to draw a certain line. As pointed out in paragraph 3 the presumption however, 
is not an effective argument against today’s pre-trial detention practice. The same 
is true about the European Court of Human Rights’ case-law on Article 5 of the 
European Convention. The criteria the Court uses are open – to a large extent 
59) ECHR 14 December 2004, appl. no. 48217/99 (Pitalugue v. France).
60) ECHR 6 March 2007, appl. no. 8036/02 (Sağat et al. v. Turkey). Similarly ECHR 17 October 
2000, appl. no. 29874/96 (Şahín v. Turkey).
61) M.S. Groenhuijsen, loc. cit., pp. 88-89.
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procedural – standards that leave room for balancing individual rights against public 
interests. With that, the Court does allow pre-trial detention to be used more than 
only reluctantly and even in a rather punitive way. The case-law demonstrates that 
the Court puts a hold on excessive and arbitrary use of pre-trial detention that 
results from altogether denying the individual right to liberty. But it also shows 
that the Court, as a part of (a risk) society, goes along with the demands of society. 
The Court and its case-law are not able or willing to disapprove or stop the way 
in which pre-trial detention is used today.
This poses the question what then could be arguments to put a hold to the 
increasing use of pre-trial detention. But maybe, this is not the right question to 
ask. Practice and theory are starting to diverge considerably. Also, practice does 
not seem to be receptive to any arguments put forward by scholars. In the reality 
of the risk society we may have to accept that pre-trial detention is no longer an 
ultimum remedium. It is on the contrary a popular preventive instrument serving 
the purpose of security, and hence an intensively used one. Perhaps it would be 
more realistic and useful to start thinking about a new theoretical framework on 
pre-trial detention. For that it would first of all be useful to look into various 
empirical questions such as the decision making of judges and prosecutors regarding 
pre-trial detention. What are accepted reasons for pre-detaining suspects (and do 
they indeed fit the theory of the risk society)? Other important questions would 
concern the relation between pre-trial detention and the final punishment. Is 
pre-trial detention not actually being used as a punishment? And how do use and 
length of pre-trial detention influence the actual punishment? Next, in connection 
with that kind of “reality” research new principles could be developed on how and 
to what extent the right to liberty could and should be protected given the new 
reality. That is not an easy task and honesty compels me to say I do not have that 
many clues yet. However, being realistic seems more fruitful than fighting a losing 
battle with idealistic but ineffective arguments.
